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183 
STRICT INTERPRETATION OF 35 U.S.C. § 112: 








The commercialization of technologies developed at 
universities is a catalyst for entrepreneurship and contributes 
significantly to economic development in the United States.1  Since 
the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act,2 universities have licensed 
numerous technologies to both new and established companies; 
however, there is still an opportunity to more efficiently translate the 
billions of federal research dollars invested in basic and applied 
research at academic institutions into commercially viable 
 
* IP Manager at Sound Interventions and Associate at Barkume and Associates, P.C.  J.D., 
cum laude, May 2011, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.  Register Patent 
Agent, March 2000.  B.S. Electrical Engineering, 1984, University of Maryland. 
** Assistant Director, Center for Biotechnology at SUNY Stony Brook and Adjunct faculty at 
Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.  J.D., Syracuse University College of Law.  
M.S. Neuroscience, Syracuse University.  B.S. Biology, SUNY Stony Brook. 
1 Roland Helm & Oliver Mauroner, Success of Research-based Spin-offs.  State-of-the-art 
and Guidelines for Further Research, REV. MANAGERIAL SCI. 237, 238 (2007). 
Two of the main forces of economic life are entrepreneurship and 
technological development.  Today, in a competitive and globalised 
world, the ability to create new innovative products and companies is 
crucial for promoting rapid structural change and national or regional 
development (NIW/Fhg-ISI 2000).  Universities and other public 
research organisations are some of the main sources of innovations.  The 
generation and specifically the application of new ideas, technologies 
and scientific knowledge are conducive to economic development, job 
creation and the formation of a competitive industrial structure.  To spin 
off a venture from a research organisation is an excellent way to 
commercialise research results and a method by which publicly financed 
research will contribute to economic and social welfare and regional 
development. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
2 35 U.S.C. §§ 202-212 (2006 & Supps. IV 2010, V). 
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technologies.3 
Most university technologies require significant funding to 
further develop the prototypes and proof-of-concepts into products 
and services that can be sold in the marketplace.4  This funding often 
comes from investments made by angel investors, venture capitalists, 
and/or corporate partners.  These investments are generally made for 
the sole purpose of generating profits, and therefore, are only made 
for commercializing university technologies when the technologies 
can survive a rigorous due diligence process.  Commercially viable 
university technologies that do not survive this due diligence process 
fail to attract the investments necessary to advance them from 
prototypes and proof-of-concepts into products and services, a chasm 
known as the ―Valley of Death,‖5 which contributes significantly to 
the inefficient translation of federal research dollars into economic 
impact in the United States. 
A significant component of the due diligence process is a 
thorough evaluation of the patents protecting the university 
technology.  Investors and corporate partners are aware that there are 
risks associated with university technology because often there is a 
―disconnect‖ between the current fundamental university technology 
and the future commercial embodiments of that technology.  The due 
diligence process evaluates whether the claims of the patent are broad 
enough to protect the current and future products and services derived 
 
3 Jerry Thursby & Sukanya Kemp, Growth and Productive Efficiency of University 
Intellectual Property Licensing, 31 RES. POL‘Y 109, 109 (2002) (―It has been suggested in a 
number of venues that university resources are not fully exploited as a source of economic 
growth and competitiveness and recent public policy has been aimed at increasing the 
commercial impact of universities.‖). 
4 Richard Jenson & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of 
University Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 240, 240-41 (2001). 
Perhaps the most striking result of the survey is that when they are 
licensed, most university inventions are little more than a ―proof of 
concept.‖  No one knows their commercial potential because they are in 
such an early stage of development.  Indeed, they are so embryonic that 
additional effort in development by the inventor is required for a 
reasonable chance of commercial success. 
Id. 
5 Steve H. Barr, Ted Baker, Stephen K. Markham, & Angus I. Kingon, Bridging the 
Valley of Death: Lessons Learned from 14 Years of Commercialization of Technology 
Education, 8 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 370, 371 (2009) (―The missing link in these 
efforts is the transition from an existing or emerging technology to the creation of a 
compelling new market-driven business.  This institutional, financial, and skill gap is 
referred to as the ‗valley of death‘ in [commercialization of technology].‖ (citations 
omitted)). 
2
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from the university technology.  However, the due diligence process 
also includes an assessment of whether these claims will survive 
reexamination and litigation without being invalidated or 
significantly narrowed. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore recent interpretations 
of patent law doctrines by the courts and how these interpretations 
affect the scope and validity of patents covering fundamental 
university technologies.  Many of these interpretations have the goal 
of increasing the quantity and quality of information disclosed in a 
patent, a significant issue for early stage technology.  A better 
understanding of the effects of these holdings on fundamental 
university patents by the stakeholders in university technology 
commercialization will enable more efficient technology transfer 
mechanisms in the United States. 
Section II of this paper presents background information 
associated with commercialization and patenting of fundamental 
university technology.  Section III discusses the claim construction 
doctrine used for determining the scope of claim coverage and 
analyzes a recent case where this ideological difference is brought to 
the foreground.  The claim construction doctrine does not invalidate 
claims, but instead interprets what subject matter the patent may 
exclude based on the terms used in the claims.6  Section IV discusses 
the claim indefiniteness doctrine, which invalidates a claim because 
the meaning of a claim term is not clearly defined in the 
specification7 and a recent Federal Circuit case that applied the 
indefiniteness doctrine.  Section V presents the evolution of the 
written description doctrine.  The written description doctrine 
invalidates claims where the inventor did not possess (invent) the 
entire scope of the claim.8  Section VI explains the enablement 
doctrine, which has long been used to police the adequacy of the 
disclosure in the specification.9  The enablement doctrine invalidates 
claims that cover subject matter that is not sufficiently described so 
that one skilled in the art could practice the claimed invention 
 
6 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (establishing 
Markman hearings to determine the scope of patent claims prior to patent infringement 
trials). 
7 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (requiring the invention to be distinctly claimed). 
8 See Gene Quinn, Patent Drafting: Defining Computer Implemented Processes, 
IPWATCHDOG.COM (March 14, 2011), http://ipwatchdog.com/2011/03/14/patent-drafting-
defining-computer-implemented-processes/id=15758 [hereinafter Quinn, Patent Drafting]. 
9 See id. 
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without undue experimentation.10  Recently, the courts have become 
even stricter in their application of the enablement requirement.11  
Finally, Section VII discusses how the different doctrines of patent 
law work together and how the stricter interpretations of Section 112 
achieve better quality patents.  However, this stricter interpretation 
requires that universities make sure that their patents include 
commercial applications and contain an adequate disclosure that 
describes and enables the entire scope of their inventive technology. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Commercializing university technologies is an important 
component of the economic development policy in the United 
States.12  President Barack Obama has recently stated that helping 
small businesses commercialize innovative technologies discovered 
from federally funded research and development will create jobs and 
help the country recover from its economic crisis.13  Congress has 
long recognized the usefulness of transferring federally funded 
university technology14 to private businesses for commercialization.15  
 
10 35 U.S.C. § 112 (―The specification shall enable any person skilled in the art to which it 
pertains . . . to make and use the same.‖); see also Quinn, Patent Drafting, supra note 8. 
11 See Quinn, Patent Drafting, supra note 8. 
12 Helm & Mauroner, supra note 1. 
13 Startup America, THE WHITE HOUSE, www.whitehouse.gov/issues/startup-america 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2011) (quoting a speech by President Obama on Jan. 31, 2011 regarding 
the Startup America initiative); see also Wendy H. Schacht, The Bayh-Dole Act: Selected 
Issues in Patent Policy and the Commercialization of Technology, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. 
Paper 23, 14 (2006) (―It is now widely accepted that ‗from one-third to one-half of all U.S. 
growth has come from technical progress, and that it is the principal driving force for long-
term economic growth . . . .‘ ‖); see also MARTIN KENNEY, BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE 
UNIVERSITY – INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 2-3 (1986) (―[I]n stagnation periods entrepreneurs 
with new ideas come forward to lead capitalism into technologies that form the basis of new 
industries.‖). 
14 KENNEY, supra note 13, at 30 (―[Three] great task[s] of the university [are] to perform 
research that has no immediate application to production[,] . . . . to perform basic science[,] 
and [to] provide ‗scientists [who are] able to offer fresh insights.‘ ‖) (citation omitted); see 
also Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785 
(allowing federal laboratories to apply for patents and transfer their technology, similar to 
university technology transfer).  The term ―university‖ may include government research 
facilities, where federally funded research and development is similar to research performed 
at universities.  Id. at § 2(6)(d)(1-2). 
15 See Gene Quinn, Happy Anniversary: USPTO Celebrates 30 Years of Bayh-Dole, 
IPWATCHDOG.COM (Dec. 12, 2010), http://ipwatchdog.com/2010/12/12/happy-anniversary-
uspto-celebrates-30-years-of-bayh-dole/id=13759 [hereinafter Quinn, Happy Anniversary]; 
see also DRAFTING LICENSE AGREEMENTS § 26.01, 26-28 (Michael A. Epstein & Frank L. 
4
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Under the Bayh-Dole Act universities are able to patent their 
technology and license or transfer their patents to private companies 
so that the technology can be brought to market.16  Consequently, the 
Bayh-Dole Act has been lauded for the creation of thousands of new 
businesses.17 
UNIVERSITY ISSUES WITH PATENTING 
Nonetheless, many university scientists are not interested in 
patenting their technology (so that the university can profit from 
licensing that patent), but rather, they are interested in ―engag[ing] 
the scientific community‖ through scientific presentations and 
publications.18  However, patenting the result of research and 
development plays an important role in commercializing university 
technologies.  Universities use patent licenses, both to new (start-ups) 
and established companies, as the primary mechanism of technology 
transfer.19  In return for royalties and fees back to the university, 
companies can move forward with commercializing a patent-
protected technology.20  Commercialization of university 
technologies also serves society by creating new companies, new 
jobs, and most importantly, by bringing the inventive technology to 
market.21 
Even though patents are critical to technology 
 
Politano eds., Aspen Pub. 4th ed. 2010). 
16 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 202-212; see also Schacht, supra note 13, at 4. 
17 Quinn, Happy Anniversary, supra note 15. 
18 Jennifer Carter-Johnson, Unveiling the Distinction Between the University and Its 
Academic Researchers: Lessons for Patent Infringement and University Technology 
Transfer, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 473, 475, 483 (2010). 
[I]n spite of a government requirement to disclose government-funded 
inventions to the university for licensing and the university‘s 
considerable interest in licensing such inventions, academic researchers 
routinely publish their inventions in scientific journals without university 
disclosure rather than spending the extra time required to also disclose 
the inventions to the university. 
Id. 
19 See DRAFTING LICENSE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 26-10. 
20 See id. 
21 Schacht, supra note 13, at 5 (―Special consideration concerning patent title is given to 
small businesses in part because of the role these companies were seen as playing in the 
generation of new jobs and in technological advancement.‖); see also DRAFTING LICENSE 
AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 26-6 (―[T]echnological breakthroughs can benefit both 
humankind when the breakthroughs are patented and developed into products . . . and further 
science when they are published in respected journals and presented at scientific meetings.‖). 
5
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commercialization, many university scientists prefer to publish their 
results to increase their chances of receiving further grant money.22  
However, if a patent is not applied for prior to publication or 
presentation of the scientific research, it may cause a loss of patent 
rights.23  In order to avoid the loss of patent rights, the university may 
need to quickly file a patent application that possibly does not have 
an adequate disclosure of the inventive technology.24  Similarly, 
attempting to patent the technology before the research is completed 
or before a commercial application has been determined may also 
produce an inadequate disclosure.25  As explained in this paper, an 
inadequate disclosure will result in patent claims being invalidated or 
being narrowed significantly.26  A company that licenses a weak 
patent will likely have difficulties acquiring funding, ultimately 
resulting in not being able to commercialize the inventive 
technology.27  Universities and scientists need to increase the strength 
of their patents, so that commercialization of their innovative 
technologies can be increased. 
The importance of patents was explained by the Supreme 
Court in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,28 where the 
Court stated that science is promoted when inventors receive patent 
protection for their discoveries because a patent discloses those 
discoveries to the public, particularly to those skilled in the art, 
stimulating further work and discovery.29  Furthermore, patent 
 
22 Carter-Johnson, supra note 18. 
23 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (―A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the 
invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in 
public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application 
for patent in the United States . . . .‖); see also CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY, 
THE ENTREPRENEUR‘S GUIDE TO BUSINESS LAW, 521, 531 (James W. Calhoun & Robert 
Dewey eds., Westgroup 3d ed. 2008) (―[M]any countries will not grant a patent if the 
invention is disclosed before the patent application is filed in that country.‖). 
24 See, e.g., Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 
banc). 
25 E.g., id. at 1358 (Newman, J., additional views) (stating that a patent application for 
basic scientific research was filed before a practical application was demonstrated). 
26 See supra text pp. 187-88 and accompanying notes 6-11. 
27 See Schacht, supra note 13, at 2; see also Mario W. Cardullo, Intellectual Property – 
The Basis for Venture Capital Investments, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/venture_capital_investments.htm 
(last visited October 12, 2011) (―Without the strength of the intellectual property and its 
protection, little if any investments would be made into new or growing enterprises.‖). 
28 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
29 Id. at 150-51 (explaining that the purpose of the patent system is to encourage the 
creation and disclosure to the public of new, useful, and non-obvious advances in technology 
6
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protection encourages companies to invest in the costly work of 
innovation because competitors will not be able to copy their 
technology.30  Nevertheless, some people believe that patent 
protection, with its monopoly of seventeen plus years, increases the 
cost of goods and services and holds back innovation rather than 
promoting it.31  The speed at which new technologies are advancing 
highlights this issue.32  By the time a patent is published, typically 
eighteen months after the patent is filed, technological advances have 
already made the invention obsolete in some areas, such as computer 
electronics.33  In these areas, the technology progressed without a 
patent disclosure, and yet, a subsequently obtained patent may be 
used as a weapon to stop all others in the field from pursuing 
 
and design in return for the exclusive right to exclude others from making, using, or selling 
the invention for a period of years and upon expiration of that period, the knowledge of the 
invention is available for people to make and use the invention without restriction.  Absent 
the patent system, inventors would keep the details of their invention secret and innovation 
would not progress as effectively as the patent system allows.); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 
8, cl. 8 (―To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.‖). 
When a patent is granted and the information contained in it is circulated 
to the general public and those especially skilled in the trade, such 
additions to the general store of knowledge are of such importance to the 
public weal that the Federal Government is willing to pay the high price 
of 17 years of exclusive use for its disclosure which . . . will stimulate 
ideas and the eventual development of further significant advances in the 
art. 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974). 
30 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3253 (2010) (―Although there is certainly 
disagreement about the need for patents, scholars generally agree that when innovation is 
expensive, risky, and easily copied, inventors are less likely to undertake the guaranteed 
costs of innovation in order to obtain the mere possibility of an invention that others can 
copy.‖); see also Schacht, supra note 13, at 3-4. 
31 Schacht, supra note 13, at 3; see also Paul Basken, Patents, Not Just Politics, Create 
Obstacles to University Stem-Cell Research, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 24, 2011), 
http://chronicle.com/article/Patents-Not-Just-Politics/126045/. 
32 Robert Unikel & Douglas Eveleigh, Protecting Inventors, Not Fortune Tellers: The 
Available Patent Protection for After-Developed Technologies, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 81, 85 (2006). 
Given the rapid pace of technological advance in many industries today 
(biotechnology, computers, and telecommunications, to name just a 
few), and given the potentially serious consequences of misapprehending 
and/or misapplying the law in these areas, it is extremely important for 
patentees and potential infringers/improvers to be aware of, and for 
courts to come to grips with, the confusing morass of judicial decisions 
regarding patent protection for after-developed technologies. 
Id. 
33 Dennis D. Crouch, Is Novelty Obsolete? Chronicling the Irrelevance of the Invention 
Date in U.S. Patent Law, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 53, 81 (2009). 
7
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advancements in the technology area.34  This problem is further 
exacerbated when one considers the many questionable patents that 
have been issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(―PTO‖).35 
In Bilski v. Kappos,36 the Supreme Court explained that patent 
laws need to balance ―the tension . . . between stimulating innovation 
by protecting inventors and impeding progress by granting patents 
when not justified by the statutory design.‖37  The Court stated that 
finding this balance requires an invention to be: (1) of the type the 
patent laws are designed to protect (Section 101 requirement);38 (2) 
novel (Section 102 requirement);39 (3) non-obvious (Section 103 
requirement);40 and (4) ―fully and particularly described‖ (Section 
112 requirement).41  Recently, the courts and the PTO have 
emphasized the importance of fully and particularly describing an 
invention to increase the quality of patents.42  Patents of poor quality 
 
34 Natasha N. Aljalian, The Role of Patent Scope in Biopharmaceutical Patents, 11 B.U.J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 12-15 (2005); see also Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 
632 F.3d 1246, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
35 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229 (―[S]ome business method patents raise special problems 
in terms of vagueness and suspect validity.‖). 
36 130 S. Ct. 3218. 
37 Id. at 3229. 
38 Id. at 3225. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225. 
42 Press Release, United States Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO Issues Examination 
Guidelines to Better Define the Scope of Patent Protection Thereby Improve Patent Quality, 
Release 11-11 (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2011/11_11a.jsp  
(― ‗Patent quality is essential to the proper functioning of the patent system and the 
intellectual property community has long wanted the USPTO to provide additional guidance 
to examiners and applicants to ensure better compliance with Section 112.‘ ‖ (quoting 
Director of the USPTO, David Kappos)); see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 (―The specification shall 
contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and 
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art 
to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same . . . . [and] shall conclude with one or more 
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the 
applicant regards as his invention.‖).  Section 112 also has a best mode requirement.  Id.  
This requirement will not be discussed in this paper because Congress is expected to vote to 
eliminate this requirement.  See Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform Act of 2011: An Overview, 
PATENTLY-O BLOG (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/02/patent-
reform-act-of-2011-an-overview.html.  This paper will discuss claim construction, 
indefiniteness, written description, and enablement doctrines because these doctrines affect 
the requirement to fully and particularly describe an invention.  There are other doctrines 
that affect the scope of the claims such as a disclaimer, doctrine of equivalents, and reverse 
doctrine of equivalents, but these are beyond the scope of this paper.  This paper will not 
8
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do not give the public notice of the protected scope of the patent—
thereby creating an unknown risk that discourages research and 
development, rather than promoting it.43 
A patent is comprised of a specification, which gives a broad 
comprehensive description of a design, and also comprised of the 
claims, which define the legal ―metes and bounds‖ of the invention 
using terms known in the art (technology field) or terms defined in 
the specification.44  Typically, the attorney describes embodiments 
known to the inventor (i.e. commercial applications) in the 
specification and then generates broad claims that cover not just the 
known embodiments, but also embodiments that one of ordinary skill 
in the art would be able to practice based on the description of the 
invention in the specification.45  The claims can cover a physical 
design (apparatus or device claims), an activity (process or method 
claims), or a combination of both; and based on prior patents or 
publications found by the PTO examiner, the claims may be deleted 
or changed—and new claims can be added during the patent 
examination process.46  In some cases, a functional claim (a method 
or a method of using a device) is written to cover a multitude of ways 
to perform an activity, but the specification fails to disclose 
 
discuss the disclaimer doctrine because this doctrine pertains to the statements made by an 
attorney during patent prosecution.  This paper will also not discuss the doctrine of 
equivalents because this doctrine is used by the courts to determine if ―two devices do the 
same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result.‖  
Graver Tank & Mfg., Co. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). 
43 Aljalian, supra note 34, at 12-14. 
44 Ronald B. Hildreth, Definition of a Patent, PRAC. L. INST. PAT. L.: PRAC. GUIDE § 1:2 
(2011) (―A patent is a contract between an inventor and the U.S. government under which 
the government grants the inventor a limited monopoly‖ for approximately 20 years from the 
filing of the application and ―the inventor discloses the complete invention to the          
public . . . .‖).  See generally id. at § 2:2 (stating every patent contains ―a specification and at 
least one claim.  The specification describes the complete invention.  Each claim defines the 
legal rights of the patent owner.‖ (footnote omitted)); see generally id. at 3:3 (stating that an 
examiner at the PTO examines a patent application to determine if the ―claimed subject 
matter is new, useful, and unobvious over the prior art‖ in light of the specification).  The 
examiner may reject the claim as being non-statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101; 
anticipated subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 102; obvious subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 
103; or claimed too broadly and/or not fully described by the specification under 35 U.S.C. § 
112.  See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §§ 1.01, 3.01, 5.02[4], 7.01, 7.03 (2010).  
An applicant may appeal a decision from an examiner at the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences (―BPAI‖), and thereafter, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, and finally the United States Supreme Court.  See Hildreth, supra at § 2:4. 
45 See, e.g., Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350. 
46 See Arlington, 632 F.3d at 1257-58 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
9
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(describe) embodiment covered by the claim because either (1) a 
patent draftsman failed to provide the information in the patent; (2) 
the inventor did not know the embodiments; or (3) the inventive 
technology was ―pioneering‖ technology—so new and basic that it 
starts a whole new technology area—and therefore, the inventor 
could not have known about later developments (also called ―after-
arising technology‖) in this new technology area.47 
Should the courts allow these functional claims to exclude an 
undisclosed design or activity?  Should the claims be read narrowly 
to cover only the disclosed design or activity?  Or, on a more extreme 
basis, should the claims that do not disclose in the specification the 
claimed design or activity be found invalid?  This depends on 
whether one believes that (1) the scope of the invention is determined 
by the claims and the specification should be used only to interpret 
the claim terminology and to enable one skilled in the art to make and 
use the claimed invention; or (2) the scope of the invention is 
determined by both the claims and the description of the invention in 
the specification (the specification must also define claim 
terminology and enable one skilled in the art to make and use the 
claimed invention).48  These different views represent an ideological 
disagreement that recently has been debated in a number of cases 
tried before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(―Federal Circuit‖).49 
 
47 See id. 
48 See Jason Rantanen, Arlington Industries v. Bridgeport Fittings: “The specification is 
the heart of the patent,” PATENTLY-O BLOG (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/ 
patent/2011/01/arlington-industries-v-bridgeport-fittings-the-specification-is-the-heart-
of-the-patent.html.  Compare Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 
1559, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding a claim to be invalid because it failed to satisfy the 
requirements of an adequate written description), with Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 
1303, 1326-28 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (reversing a lower court‘s holding which construed a claim 
term to be limited to less than the full scope of its ordinary meaning).  See also Ariad, 598 
F.3d at 1350 (holding description of a generic invention, failed to meet the written 
description requirement); see also Arlington, 632 F.3d at 1257-58 (Lourie, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (stating that claims should not be construed beyond the 
descriptions embodied by the inventor). 
49 See Rantanen, supra note 48; see, e.g., Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d 1559 (affirming invalidity of 
claims because of insufficient description in the claim).  Compare Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1328 
(reversing district court‘s application of claims construction, because claim in court‘s view 
was not ambiguous), with id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority 
largely because ―the specification contains no disclosure of baffles at right angles‖); 
compare Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350 (holding the asserted claims of the patent invalid for failure 
to meet the written requirement by describing only a generic invention), with id. at 1361 
(Rader, J., dissenting in part) (describing the majority as ―rejecting that statutory balance in 
10
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This ideological disagreement greatly impacts university 
patents where there is an inadequate description, the commercial 
applications of the research were not known by the inventor, or where 
the subject matter of the patent was pioneering technology and the 
claims for that technology cover advances that are later invented.50  If 
the courts hold that the scope of an invention is determined by both 
the claims and the description of the invention in the specification, 
which is the direction in which some of the judges on the Federal 
Circuit seem to be headed, then many university patents may be 
invalidated, or at a minimum, greatly narrowed in scope.51 
III.  CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
It has been held by the courts for many years that ―the name 
of the game is the claim,‖ meaning that the scope of the invention is 
determined solely by the claims.52  In Phillips v. AWH Corp.,53 the 
Federal Circuit en banc addressed to what extent a patent‘s 
 
favor of an undefined ‗written description‘ doctrine, this court ignores the problems of 
standardless decision making and serious conflicts with other areas of patent law.‖); 
compare Arlington, 632 F.3d at 1257 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(dissenting because the written description provided by the inventor defines the limits to a 
patent, because ―[a] patent is a teaching document.  In almost all cases, the inventors, and 
their patent solicitors, knew what was invented and generally disclosed their invention in 
competent language.‖), with id. at 1255-56 (majority opinion) (finding error in the lower 
court limiting ―spring metal adapter‖ to mean only a ―split‖ absent any extrinsic evidence 
supporting such a construction).  The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over patent 
application appeals, patent interferences, and decisions of district courts throughout the 
country related to patent law.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  Hence, 
decisions from the Federal Circuit regarding patent law are similarly precedential to 
decisions by the Supreme Court.  See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of 
the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 274-76 (2002).  Federal 
Circuit cases are heard by a panel of three judges and depending on the ideological make-up 
of the panel, case outcomes sometimes differ and when this happens, the Federal Circuit will 
take the case en banc before a panel of nine judges.  See, e.g., Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340. 
50 See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353; see also Unikel & Eveleigh, supra note 32, at 86; see also 
Invention, Creation, & Public Policy Symposium: Patent Reform & Innovation Incentive: 
Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 IOWA F. CORP. L. 1083, 1085-86 (Summer 2009). 
51 See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353 (stating that many university patents usually include 
groundbreaking research which limits the patent protection since they are unable to describe 
the patent with detailed specification). 
52 Harold C. Wegner, Arlington Indus. v. Bridgeport Fittings: The 20 Year Claim 
Construction Debate, IPFRONTLINE (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.IPFrontline.com (quoting 
Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims-American 
Perspectives, 21 INT‘L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990)); Arlington 
Indus., 632 F.3d at 1256 (quoting Rich, supra). 
53 415 F.3d 1303. 
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specification is relied on to determine the scope of its claims.54  The 
court stated that ―[i]t is a ‗bedrock principle‘ of patent law‖ that the 
claims define the scope of the invention, for which the patentee can 
exclude all others from making or using.55  Yet, the claims are ―read 
in view of the specification.‖56  This means that a person trying to 
understand the meaning of the claims looks to ― ‗the words of the 
claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution 
history, and extrinsic evidence.‘ ‖57  The court also stated that one 
should ―avoid the danger of reading limitations from the specification 
into the claim.‖58  In fact, the court expressly stated that the claims 
are not limited merely to the disclosed embodiment.59  In deciding 
Phillips, the Federal Circuit found that even though the specification 
did not disclose ―baffles at right angles,‖ the claims, reciting ―inward 
extending structures,‖ did not limit the angle of the baffles 
(structures); therefore, ―baffles at right angles‖ were covered by the 
claims.60  Since Phillips was decided, it has been the most cited case 
in patent law.61  Its precedent has been carefully followed with 
respect to device claims, but has occasionally been brought into 
question with respect to functional claims.62 
Functional claims are method claims that recite steps to 
achieve a particular result.63  The issue with these claims is that all 
devices that perform the steps to achieve the result are covered by 
these claims, including devices the patent owner never thought of or 
described in the patent.64  These are the types of patents that many 
people worry hold back innovation rather than promote it. 
 
54 Id. at 1312 (holding that the specification and the prosecution history should have 
greater emphasis than extrinsic sources in determining the definition of claim terms). 
55 Id. (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys, Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 
1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see also Markman, 52 F.3d at 980 (―The written description part of 
the specification itself does not delimit the right to exclude.  That is the function and purpose 
of claims.‖). 
56 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 978-79). 
57 Id. at 1314 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc., 381 F.3d at 1116). 
58 Id. at 1323. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
61 See Dennis Crouch, Top Ten Most Cited Patent Cases 2007-2010, PATENTLY-O BLOG 
(May 30, 2010), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/05/top-ten-most-cited-patent-cases-
2007-2010.html. 
62 See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350. 
63 Id. at 1349-50. 
64 Id. 
12
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In Arlington Industries v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc.,65 Chief 
Judge Rader cited Phillips as the basis for holding that the district 
court improperly imported a claim limitation from the specification.66  
The question in Arlington Industries was whether the term ―spring 
metal adaptor‖ in the asserted claim means ―an adaptor made of a 
spring metal‖ or a metal adaptor that expands and contracts (springs) 
because of a ―split.‖67  The defendant, Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 
argued that although the claim did not recite a split as other claims 
did, the split was nevertheless required by the specification because 
all the drawings showed a split in the adaptor, and there was no 
description of an embodiment without a split.68  However, the court 
found that the language in the specification did not indicate that the 
inventor intended ―to limit the claims to ‗split‘ embodiments.‖69 
In an interesting separate opinion, Judge Lourie questioned 
whether the precedent set in Phillips should be followed.70  Judge 
Lourie argued that the scope of the invention is determined by both 
the claims and the description of the invention in the specification.71  
―[T]he basic mandate is for claims to be interpreted in light of the 
specification of which they are a part because the specification 
describes what the inventors invented.‖72  In Judge Lourie‘s view, a 
patent specification is a teaching document not only for the definition 
of a claim term, but also for the definition of what the invention is.73  
Judge Lourie stated that if the inventor invented an adaptor with a 
split, the inventor should not be able to claim an adaptor without a 
split.74  Perhaps, an adaptor without a split might be held to infringe 
the claims under the doctrine of equivalents, but it should not literally 
 
65 632 F.3d 1246. 
66 See id. at 1253. 
67 Id. at 1248. 
68 Id. at 1253.  In this litigation there were two patents at issue.  Id. at 1248.  The first had 
no mention of an embodiment without a split, while the second incorporated by reference 
another patent where there was an embodiment without a split.  Arlington, 632 F.3d at 1248. 
69 Id. at 1254. 
70 Id. at 1258 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
71 See id. at 1257.  Judge Lourie concurred with the decision regarding the patent that 
incorporated by reference the other patent, which had an embodiment without a split, but 
dissented with the decision regarding the first patent where there was no embodiment with a 
split design.  Id.; see also Rantanen, supra note 48. 
72 Arlington, 632 F.3d at 1257. 
73 Id. 
74 See id. at 1258; see also Rantanen, supra note 48. 
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infringe the claims.75  Judge Lourie explained that most inventors 
teach what they have invented.76  However, a problem arises when 
inventors use their patents ―as a business weapon‖ by asserting them 
―against someone engaged in activity not contemplated by the 
inventors as part of their invention.‖77  In this situation, the claims are 
modified during prosecution to incorporate the non-contemplated 
activity.78  In Judge Lourie‘s view, ―patents should be narrow‖ and 
limited to what one has invented, and the specification should 
―always play a role in determining what the inventor has invented 
and thus help shape the scope of protection‖ that the claims cover.79  
Judge Lourie advised, ―[T]he claims should not mean more than what 
the specification indicates . . . the inventors invented.‖80 
The position advocated by Judge Lourie would require the 
inventor to think of and disclose numerous possible embodiments—
an onerous task for anyone, particularly the university scientist who 
is patenting basic technology with few known commercial 
applications.81  Judge Lourie ―seems willing to pay this cost because 
of the greater certainty‖ of disclosure.82 
In the quest for better quality patents, might the Federal 
Circuit, the Supreme Court, or Congress accept Judge Lourie‘s 
view?83  As Arlington Industries continues to be litigated, the district 
court stated that the ―Federal Circuit‘s [broad claim construction] is 
controversial and has some likelihood of being re-heard en banc.‖84  
It is likely that the Federal Circuit will adjust the claim construction 
doctrine to be more in line with the indefiniteness doctrine, the 
written description doctrine, and the enablement doctrine, each 
 
75 See Rantanen, supra note 48. 
76 Arlington, 632 F.3d at 1257. 
77 Id. at 1257-58. 
78 Id. at 1258. 
79 Wegner, supra note 52. 
80 Arlington, 632 F.3d at 1258. 
81 See Rantanen, supra note 48. 
82 Id. 
83 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3253 (quoting O‘Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 121 (1853) 
(stating that an inventor ―can lawfully claim only what he has invented and described, and if 
he claims more his patent is void‖)). 
84 Dennis Crouch, Patently-O Bits & Bytes by Lawrence Higgins, PATENTLY-O BLOG 
(Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/03/patently-o-bits-bytes-by-
lawrence-higgins-1.html (regarding the Arlington district court opinion citing Jason 
Rantanen‘s Patently-O blog post).  Furthermore, ―[t]he district court favorably noted the 
‗over 100‘ comments that had been added to the post.‖  Id. 
14
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described below.  If this is the case, it is imperative that university 
patents contain an adequate disclosure of their inventive technology 
with as many commercial applications as possible. 
IV. CLAIM INDEFINITENESS 
Judge Lourie‘s position finds some support in the claim 
indefiniteness doctrine.  Under this doctrine, a claim that does not 
clearly delineate the boundaries of an invention will be found 
invalid.85  This typically occurs when a claim term is not clearly 
defined in the specification.86  When a university quickly files a 
patent application to avoid the loss of patent rights, it is likely that 
one or more of the claim terms are not clearly defined in the 
specification.  This can also happen when the scientist has minimal 
industrial contact and does not know the multiple meanings of one or 
more terms within that industry. 
In Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., v. M-I LLC,87 the 
Federal Circuit stated: 
Because claims delineate the patentee‘s right to 
exclude, the patent statute requires that the scope of 
the claims be sufficiently definite to inform the public 
of the bounds of the protected invention, i.e., what 
subject matter is covered by the exclusive rights of the 
patent.  Otherwise, competitors cannot avoid 
infringement, defeating the public notice function of 
patent claims.88 
In Halliburton, the court held that the asserted patent was invalid 
because the degree of fragility for the claim term ―fragile gel‖ was 
not identified in the specification causing the claim to be indefinite.89  
The court reasoned that this allowed the claims to cover not only 
Halliburton‘s invention, but also the prior art and all future 
improvements to the gel‘s fragility.90 
 
85 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring the invention to be distinctly claimed). 
86 See Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(stating that a claim is indefinite when the bounds of a claim are so ambiguous that a skilled 
artisan cannot determine the boundaries of the claim based on the specification). 
87 514 F.3d 1244. 
88 Id. at 1249. 
89 Id. at 1254. 
90 Id. 
15
Barkume and Bielski: University Patenting Methods
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
198 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 28 
The Federal Circuit has also used the indefiniteness doctrine 
to invalidate means-plus-function claims that do not have a 
corresponding structure in the specification,91 claims that include 
numeric limitations ―without disclosing [in the specification] which 
of multiple methods of measuring that number should be used,‖92 and 
claims that contain a term that is ―completely dependent on a 
person‘s subjective opinion.‖93 
V. WRITTEN DESCRIPTION 
The Federal Circuit explained in Ariad Pharms. Inc. v. Eli 
Lilly & Co.94 that in many instances the specification of a university 
patent does not contain specific examples, and the functional claims 
are directed to a process that solves a problem and covers every 
device that can perform the process or every compound developed by 
the process.95  This happens because ―universities may not have the 
resources or inclination to work out the practical implications of 
[their] research‖ (the patent was applied for too early or the 
commercial application was not determined).96  This is different, 
however, from after-arising technologies, which cannot be described 
in the specification of a pioneering patent because the inventor could 
not have known about further developments in the new technology 
area.97  In his dissenting opinion in Ariad, Chief Judge Rader 
explained that it has been long-established law that pioneering 
patents which block the practice of after-arising technology must be 
licensed.98  Furthermore, ―[t]his blocking condition can exist even 
where the original patentee ‗failed to contemplate‘ an additional 
element found in the improvement patent.‖99  However, Judge Lourie 
and other judges on the Federal Circuit have held that the written 
 
91 Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Techs. Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (―If there 
is no structure in the specification corresponding to the means-plus-function limitation in the 
claims, the claim will be found invalid as indefinite.‖). 
92 Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 514 F.3d at 1250 (citing Honeywell Int‘l, Inc. v. Int‘l 
Trade Comm‘n, 341 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
93 Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
94 598 F.3d 1336. 
95 Id. at 1352. 
96 Id. at 1353. 
97 Unikel, supra note 32, at 86; see also Invention, Creation, & Public Policy Symposium, 
supra note 50, at 1086. 
98 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1365 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
99 Id. (quoting A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.2d 700, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
16
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description requirement mandates that an inventor ―possess‖ an 
invention in order for his patent to exclude others from making it.100 
The requirement for a written description has been a 
conflicting area of law for more than a decade.101  Although there has 
always been a written description requirement with regard to a later 
filed application claiming priority (an earlier filing date) to an earlier 
filed application, the requirement was not applied to patents not 
claiming priority.102  However in The Regents of the University of 
California v. Eli Lilly,103 decided in 1997, the Federal Circuit applied 
the written description requirement ―apart from enablement and 
beyond the priority context.‖104  In Eli Lilly, the Federal Circuit, with 
Judge Lourie writing the opinion for the court, held that the written 
description requirement is separate from the enablement requirement 
and is necessary in all specifications for patent validity.105  The court 
found that the specification provided an adequate description for rat 
insulin cDNA, but it did not provide an adequate description for 
mammalian insulin cDNA even though the method claims covered 
both.106  The court stated that the written description requirement of 
Section 112 required that the invention be described in the 
specification ―in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly 
conclude that ‗the inventor invented the claimed invention.‘ ‖107  The 
requirement mandates that a ― ‗precise definition, such as by 
structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties‘ ‖ be in the 
specification.108  A mere statement of the DNA and a ―potential 
method for isolating it‖ is not enough.109  In addition, ―a description 
 
100 Id. at 1351. 
101 Id. at 1360 (Gajarsa, J., concurring); see also id. at 1340 (majority opinion) (agreeing 
to hear the case en banc to settle written description requirement); see also Lizardtech, Inc. 
v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc. (Lizardtech II), 433 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rader, J., 
dissenting from the court‘s decision not to hear the case en banc); see also Enzo Biochem, 
Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., dissenting from the 
court‘s decision not to hear the case en banc). 
102 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1367 (Linn, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
103 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
104 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1367 (Linn, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); see also id. 
at 1365 (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (stating that the doctrine of 
claim construction and the enablement doctrine provide the required limitations for the scope 
of an invention).  The enablement doctrine is described in the next section. 
105 Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1562. 
106 Id. at 1566. 
107 Id. (quoting Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
108 Id. (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
109 Id. at 1566-67 (quoting Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1170). 
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which renders obvious a claimed invention‖ is also not enough.110  
The University of California argued that it disclosed a general 
method of isolating cDNA and a specific example of a species 
covered by the generic claimed, which together enabled one skilled in 
the art to make and use the entire genus.111  The court held that a 
description of one species of a genus is not a description of the whole 
genus and that the specification must contain a description of the 
entire invention in addition to enabling the entire invention.112  The 
court explained that a description by function only describes what a 
genus does, and not what the genus is.113 
After Eli Lilly, a number of Federal Circuit cases specifically 
addressed the written description requirement.114  Many of the 
technologies were developed and patented by universities,115 and 
most of these cases involved patents for biotechnology or 
pharmaceuticals that had broad generic functional claims with a 
description of only one species.116  In Carnegie Mellon University v. 
Hoffman-LA Roche Inc.,117 the Federal Circuit refined its standard 
stating that ―[f]or inventions in an unpredictable art, adequate written 
description of a genus which embraces widely variant species cannot 
be achieved by disclosing only one species within the genus.‖118  The 
 
110 Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567 (citing Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 1568. 
113 Id. 
114 E.g., Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340; Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 541 
F.3d 1115, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Lizardtech II, 433 F.3d at 1374; Invitrogen Corp. v. 
Clontech Labs., 429 F.3d 1052, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 
2004); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 917 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Enzo, 
323 F.3d at 960. 
115 E.g., Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340 (involving ―methods for regulating cellular responses to 
external stimuli by reducing NF-kB activity in a cell‖ developed by MIT and Harvard 
College); Carnegie Mellon, 541 F.3d at 1118 (involving isolated DNA developed by 
Carnegie Mellon); Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 918 (involving a pharmaceutical product 
developed by the University of Rochester). 
116 E.g., Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340 (involving ―methods for regulating cellular responses to 
external stimuli by reducing NF-kB activity in a cell‖); Carnegie Mellon, 541 F.3d at 1118 
(involving isolated DNA); Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 918 (involving a pharmaceutical 
product). 
117 541 F.3d 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
118 Carnegie Mellon, 541 F.3d at 1124 (italics omitted) (quoting The Guidelines for 
Examination of Patent Applications under the 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, ―Written Description‖ 
Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 10-99, 1106 (Jan. 5, 2001)). 
18
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written description will only be adequate if a representative number 
of species are disclosed that show ―one of skill in the art would 
recognize that the applicant was in possession of the necessary 
common attributes or features of the elements possessed by the 
members of the genus in view of the species disclosed.‖119  The court 
further explained: 
[W]hat is needed to support generic claims to 
biological subject matter depends on a variety of 
factors, such as the existing knowledge in the 
particular field, the extent and content of the prior art, 
the maturity of the science or technology, the 
predictability of the aspect at issue, and other 
considerations appropriate to the subject matter.120 
One case, where the asserted claims were not for a technology 
in the unpredictable arts of chemistry and biology, was Lizardtech, 
Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc.121  The method claims asserted 
by Lizardtech and the Regents of the University of California were 
directed to software.122  The court held that the claims for software 
that perform an image compression technique called seamless 
discrete wavelet transformation (DWT) were invalid because the 
specification only described ―maintaining updated sums of [the] 
DWT coefficients‖ rather than performing a seamless DWT.123  The 
court further explained that the written description requirement 
usually rises and falls with the enablement requirement because ―a 
recitation of how to make and use the invention across the full 
breadth of the claim is ordinarily sufficient to demonstrate that the 
inventor possesses the full scope of the invention, and vice versa.‖124  
The court reasoned that in this case ―a person of skill in the art would 
not understand how to make a seamless DWT generically and would 
not understand Lizardtech to have invented a method for making 
seamless DWT,‖ only a method of maintaining updated sums of the 
DWT.125  In a dissenting opinion for the court‘s denial to rehear the 
 
119 Id. (citing The Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications, supra note 118). 
120 Id. at 1126 (quoting Capon, 418 F.3d at 1359). 
121 (Lizardtech I), 424 F.3d 1336, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
122 Id. (involving a software image compression technique developed by the Regents of 
the University of California). 
123 Id. at 1344. 
124 Id. at 1345. 
125 Id. 
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case en banc, Judge Rader discussed the lack of clarity for the proper 
written description test.126  Judge Rader further explained that the 
evolving written description doctrine is inconsistent with the court‘s 
decision in Phillips, because Phillips states that limitations from the 
specification should not be read into the claims, yet the written 
description doctrine requires the claims to be limited to what is 
described in the specification.127 
Notably, in ICU Medical, Inc. v. Alaris Medical Systems, 
Inc.,128 the Federal Circuit held that the claims, which were device 
claims directed to subject matter in the predictable arts, were 
invalid.129  The court stated that the device claims overreached the 
scope of the inventor‘s contribution to the field of art because the 
claims were broad enough to cover both valves that had a spike and 
valves that did not have a spike, but the specification only disclosed 
valves with a spike; therefore, the written description requirement 
was not fulfilled and the claims were invalid.130  Although the court 
questioned importing limitations from the specification, citing 
Phillips, the court explained, ― ‗[T]he line between construing terms 
and importing limitations can be discerned with reasonable certainty 
and predictability if the court‘s focus remains on understanding how 
a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the claim 
terms.‘ ‖131  The court determined that one skilled in the art would 
understand the claims to cover only valves with a spike because the 
specification did not describe piercing by the spike as being optional, 
there was no suggestion the piercing could be accomplished by 
anything other than a pointed spike, and the figures only showed a 
pointed spike.132  These cases show that even in the stable arts, patent 
scope is narrowed when all embodiments are not envisioned to allow 
a sufficient description in the specification—likewise a concern for 
university patents. 
 
126 Lizardtech II, 433 F.3d at 1380 (denying rehearing en banc). 
127 Id. at 1381. 
128 558 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
129 Id. at 1379; but see Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Ball Metal Beverage Container 
Corp., 635 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (stating that original claims can show 
possession of the invention however ―claims to a functionally defined genus, will not satisfy 
the written description requirement without a disclosure showing that the applicant had 
invented species sufficient to support the claim‖). 
130 ICU Medical, 558 F.3d at 1378. 
131 Id. at 1375 (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323). 
132 Id. 
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In order to bring certainty to the written description doctrine, 
the Federal Circuit agreed to hear Ariad en banc.133  Ariad asserted 
patent claims for a method of reducing the activity of ―a previously 
unknown protein, called NF-kB . . . found to mediate certain 
intracellular signaling . . . . [thereby] reduc[ing] the symptoms of 
certain diseases.‖134  The technology was developed and patented by 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard College, and the 
Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research.135  Similar to Eli Lilly, 
the inventor claimed a method encompassing a genus while the 
specification disclosed only a single species.136 
The Federal Circuit upheld the requirement for a written 
description that teaches the entire scope of the claimed invention in 
the specification.137  Judge Lourie, writing for the majority, asserted 
that ―it is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession‖ of 
the claimed invention.138  He explained that an invention must be 
fully and particularly described so that ― ‗the scope of the right to 
exclude, as set forth in the claims, does not overreach the scope of the 
inventor‘s contribution to the field of art as described in the patent 
specification.‘ ‖139  The court‘s decision clarified the test for a 
sufficient written description as, ―whether the disclosure of the 
application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art 
that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of 
the filing date.‖140  Showing possession of the invention varies 
depending on the scope of the claims, the existing knowledge in the 
technology field, the prior art, the maturity of the technology, and the 
predictability of the art.141  The court did not identify a specific form 
of disclosure required to meet the written description requirement; 
however, it did state that a description that merely makes the 
invention obvious is not enough.142  Judge Rader and Judge Linn did 
not agree with the majority‘s position.143  They believed that the 
 
133 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340. 
134 Id. at 1358-59 (Newman, J., additional views). 
135 Id. at 1340 (majority opinion). 
136 Id. at 1350. 
137 Id. at 1344. 
138 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352. 
139 Id. at 1353-54 (quoting Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 920). 
140 Id. at 1351 (citing Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 1352. 
143 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1361 (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); see also 
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enablement doctrine is sufficient to meet the requirements of Section 
112, and a written description requirement is only necessary in the 
priority context.144  Judge Rader explained in his dissent that a 
patentee cannot foresee future improvements to incorporate them into 
the specification and yet ―[t]he Supreme Court has long 
acknowledged the ‗well established‘ rule that ‗an improver cannot 
appropriate the basic patent of another and that the improver without 
a license is an infringer and may be sued as such.‘ ‖145  He further 
explained that a blocking condition typically occurs when ―a 
pioneering patent claims a genus and an improvement patent later 
claims a species of that genus.‖146  Judge Rader‘s concern with the 
new written description doctrine was that ―mere improvements will 
likely invalidate genus patents.‖147  Because many university patents 
are for pioneering technologies with unknown improvements, the 
written description requirement will greatly impact the validity of 
their claims. 
Ariad, sharing the same concern, complained that the written 
description doctrine disadvantages universities because ―basic 
research cannot be patented.‖148  The court responded to this criticism 
by explaining that ―[p]atents are not awarded for academic      
theories . . . . ‗but compensation for its successful conclusion.‘ ‖149  
Judge Newman joined the court‘s opinion, but in an additional views 
section stated that the real issue Ariad faced was that its research 
―was taken to the patent system before its practical application was 
demonstrated.‖150  In requiring a written description that is separate 
from enablement and the priority context, the Federal Circuit is 
requiring universities to apply their basic research to at least one 
practical application and preferably many more when trying to 
 
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc. (Univ. of Rochester II), 375 F.3d 1303, 1307 
(Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see also id. at 1325 (Linn. J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see also Enzo, 323 F.3d at 976 (Rader, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see also id. at 987 (Linn, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc). 
144 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1361-64 (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); id. at 
1367 (Linn, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
145 Id. at 1365 (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (quoting Temca Elec. 
Motor Co. v. Apco Mfg. Co., 275 U.S. 319, 328 (1928)). 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 1366. 
148 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353 (majority opinion). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 1358 (Newman, J., additional views). 
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achieve broader patent scope. 
VI. ENABLEMENT 
When universities quickly file a patent application, it is likely 
that they have not enabled their invention because they have not put 
enough thought and time into providing an adequate disclosure.151  In 
Ariad, Judges Rader and Linn questioned whether Section 112 
requires a separate written description of the invention; however, 
there was no question that Section 112 requires the invention to be 
―enabled.‖152  The enablement doctrine requires ―the specification of 
a patent [to] teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the 
full scope of the claimed invention without ‗undue   
experimentation.‘ ‖153  ―Whether undue experimentation is needed is 
not a single, simple factual determination, but rather is a conclusion 
reached by weighing many factual considerations.‖154  The factual 
considerations the courts will look at are the Wands factors, which 
are: 
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the 
amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the 
presence or absence of working examples, (4) the 
nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, 
(6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the 
predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the 
breadth of the claims.155 
In Penda Corp. v. United States,156 the Federal Circuit stated 
that the scope of the enablement in the specification ―must bear a 
reasonable relationship‖ with the scope of the claims.157  ―In arts 
involving predictable factors, such as patents in the mechanical or 
electrical arts, a single embodiment provides broad enablement . . . . 
[I]n arts involving unpredictable factors, such as chemistry and 
 
151 E.g., id. (stating that a patent application for basic scientific research was filed before a 
practical application was demonstrated). 
152 Id. at 1361 (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); Ariad, 598 F.3d at 
1367 (Linn, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
153 In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112 ). 
154 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
155 Id. 
156 29 Fed. Cl. 533 (1993). 
157 Id. at 556. 
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physiology, the requisite scope of enablement varies inversely with 
the degree of unpredictability of the factors involved.‖158  To improve 
the quality of patents, the Federal Circuit has shifted this philosophy 
and, even in the predictable arts, has limited the ability of a single 
embodiment to provide support for broad claims that cover different 
embodiments. 
In Liebel-Flarsheim v. Medrad,159 the Federal Circuit heard 
two appeals: first on the district court‘s claim construction160 and 
then, after remand, on whether the claims were invalid due to the lack 
of a written description and enablement.161  The claims, as originally 
filed, recited a pressure jacket, but during prosecution the pressure 
jacket limitation was removed, likely because Liebel found out 
Medrad‘s device did not have a pressure jacket.162  The district court 
construed the claims as requiring a pressure jacket.163  The Federal 
Circuit in Liebel I held that the scope of the claim was broader than 
the district court‘s interpretation because ―although all the described 
embodiments include a pressure jacket, the disclosure did not clearly 
disavow embodiments lacking a pressure jacket.‖164  On remand, the 
district court held that ―the claims were invalid for lack of written 
description because the specification d[id] not describe a jacketless 
injector.‖165  Furthermore, the district court, after considering the 
Wands factors, held that the claims were also invalid for lack of 
enablement because ―no prototypes of a jacketless injector had been 
made or described at the time of filing, and that the state of the art 
was such that a jacketless system with a disposable syringe would 
have been a ‗true innovation.‘ ‖166  On appeal, the Federal Circuit did 
not consider invalidity based on written description because it first 
held that the claims were invalid based on lack of enablement.167 
Liebel argued that the claims were enabled because the 
 
158 Id. 
159 Liebel I, 358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Liebel II, 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
160 Liebel I, 358 F.3d at 900. 
161 Liebel II, 481 F.3d at 1373. 
162 Id. at 1374.  ―[A] pressure jacket [is] necessary to ‗maintain the integrity of the syringe 
housing against pressures the syringe encounters during operation of the injector.‘ ‖  Id. at 
1375. 
163 Id. at 1374. 
164 Id. at 1374-75. 
165 Liebel II, 481 F.3d at 1375. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 1380. 
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asserted claims required neither a pressure jacket nor the absence of a 
pressure jacket and the specification enabled its preferred 
embodiment of a syringe with a pressure jacket.168  Liebel also argued 
that after reading the specification, one skilled in the art would only 
be required to do additional work and not undue experimentation to 
produce a jacketless injector because its invention pertained to the 
mechanical arts in which ―a single embodiment can enable a broad 
claim.‖169  Medrad argued that ―although every embodiment of a 
claim does not need to be disclosed in the specification, the 
disclosure must teach the full range of embodiments in order for the 
claims to be enabled, and here the disclosure does not teach an 
injector without a pressure jacket.‖170  The Federal Circuit agreed 
with Medrad and stated ―[t]hat [the] full scope must be enabled.‖171  
The court reasoned that the patent taught away from jacketless 
injectors, that pressure jackets were in every figure and every 
discussion of every figure, and that testimonial evidence showed that 
a jacketless injector was not known at the time of filing.172  The court 
ended with this final statement: 
The irony of this situation is that Liebel successfully 
pressed to have its claims include a jacketless system, 
but, having won that battle, it then had to show that 
such a claim was fully enabled, a challenge it could 
not meet.  The motto, ―beware of what one asks for,‖ 
might be applicable here.173
 
Similarly, in Automotive Technologies International, Inc. v. 
BMW,174 the Federal Circuit held that broad claims that covered both 
mechanical and electrical sensors for side impact airbags were not 
enabled because the specification described mechanical sensors but 
had only a vague description of an electronic switch.175  The court 
explained that the specification and the figures only had a concept 
 
168 Id. at 1378. 
169 Id. at 1378-79. 
170 Liebel II, 481 F.3d at 1378. 
171 Id. at 1379. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 1380. 
174 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
175 Id. at 1282; see also Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(holding that broad claims that covered video games and movies were not enabled because 
the specification only taught the use of video games). 
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and not a specific design, and that the ―mere boxed figure of the 
electronic sensor and the few lines of description‖ would not teach 
one skilled in the art to make and use an electronic sensor.176  Even 
though Automotive Technologies International argued that one 
skilled in the art would know the missing information, the court 
stated: 
[T]he rule that a specification need not disclose what 
is well known in the art is ―merely a rule of 
supplementation, not a substitute for a basic enabling 
disclosure.‖ . . . ―[O]mission of minor details does not 
cause a specification to fail to meet the enablement 
requirement.  However, when there is no disclosure of 
any specific starting material or of any of the 
conditions under which a process can be carried out, 
undue experimentation is required.‖177 
The court noted that the mechanical sensor required two columns of 
description and the electronic sensor needed a similar disclosure.178  
Even though enablement of broad claims is more easily achieved in 
the mechanical and electrical arts because a description of how to 
make and use one or a few embodiments allows a person skilled in 
the art to make and use a broad range of embodiments, these cases 
show that this is not always the case. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In his quest for better quality patents, the Director of the PTO, 
David Kappos, explained recently that the Ariad decision is important 
because after enablement, the written description requirement ensures 
that applicants‘ claims do not cover more than they are entitled to 
cover, i.e. more than they have invented and disclosed.179  The 
written description requirement protects the integrity of the patent 
system, by invalidating over-broad patents, especially method claims 
that claim the problem to be solved or the results to be achieved 
 
176 Auto. Techs., 501 F.3d at 1283. 
177 Id. at 1283-84 (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997)). 
178 Id. at 1284. 
179 Symposium, Thoughts from the George Washington University Law School 
Symposium on Intellectual Property: Building Bridges and Making Connections Across the 
IP System, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 273 (2010) (Remarks by David J. Kappos). 
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rather than claiming how those results are actually achieved.180
 
Kappos describes the use of three patent law filters working 
together to set the boundaries of claim coverage in each patent.181  He 
explains that some claims may be so over-broad that they fail to meet 
the requirements of patentable subject matter (Section 101) because 
their broadness makes them an abstract idea with no physical 
limitations.182  In this scenario, Section 101 acts as a coarse (first) 
filter invalidating claims that encompass mental processes performed 
by a person, laws of nature, or other such abstractions.183  Next, 
Section 112 acts as a fine (second) filter because it ensures that the 
full scope of the claims is fully described and fully enabled, i.e. that 
the applicant described how to make and use an invention that the 
applicant actually possessed.184  Finally, Sections 102 and 103 act as 
an even finer (third) filter so that the boundaries of the invention are 
defined to be novel and non-obvious over the prior art.185  Since the 
Supreme Court decided Bilski in 2010, in which the Court declined to 
provide a test for determining what an abstract idea is, the PTO has 
begun to reject many broad claims using Section 112.186 
As the Federal Circuit and the PTO strive to increase the 
quality of patents, it appears that broad claim language and especially 
―functional claim language that sweepingly encompasses after-arising 
technology‖ will likely be found invalid under either the 
indefiniteness doctrine, the written description doctrine, or the 
enablement doctrine.187  Furthermore, it is likely that the Federal 
Circuit will adjust the claim construction doctrine to be in line with 
these doctrines, thereby greatly narrowing the scope of broad 
claims.188  Hence, broad functional claims, even for technology areas 
in the stable arts, which do not disclose specific embodiments 




182 Id.; Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229. 
183 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229. 
184 Invention, Creation, & Public Policy Symposium, supra note 50 at 1113, n.168. 
185 Id. at 1083. 
186 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3258-59 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
187 Kevin Emerson Collins, An Initial Comment on Ariad: Written Description and the 
Baseline of Patent Protection for After-Arising Technology, PATENTLY O-PATENT L.J. 60, 
70 (2010). 
188 See supra notes 84-85. 
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embodiments disclosed.189  If the claims are not limited, they may be 
invalidated under the written description doctrine or the enablement 
doctrine.190  Although one may think that a patent with broad claims 
is better for attracting business commercialization, if the courts 
invalidate similarly broad claims in other patents, then the claims will 
have a cloud over them (be in doubt) and investors will likely be 
discouraged from investing in technology that may lack patent 
protection.191 
Patents that promote commercialization of a technology, are 
patents that (1) have claims that will be held valid by the courts, (2) 
protect the technology that will be brought to market, and (3) do not 
have claim limitations that can be easily designed around.192  
Accordingly, universities should make sure that in addition to broad 
functional claims, they also have narrow claims that cover specific 
embodiments that are adequately described in the specification.  This 
increased emphasis on the requirements of Section 112 necessitates 
that university patent applications are filed when research is further 
developed and at a minimum, one and preferably many commercial 
applications are known, so that it can be enabled, broader patent 
scope can be obtained, the terms can be properly defined, and it 
meets the requirement of the written description doctrine.  Claims 
that are limited to specific embodiments, which are fully and 
distinctly described in the specification, will withstand scrutiny but 
may fail to prevent others from entering the technology field.  
Therefore, it is also important for universities to submit new patent 
applications for any future developments of the technology. 
 
189 See supra notes 84-85. 
190 Liebel II, 481 F.3d at 1378-80. 
191 See Gene Quinn, Show Me the IP! Venture Capital Success Based on Patents, 
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